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Note from the Field
DEPOSING EXPERT WITNESSES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGATION
JAMES B. BURNSf
I. BACKGROUND
A. Environmental Litigation Cannot Be Successfully
Prosecuted or Defended Without Experts
E NVIRONMENTAL litigation' is, by nature, hyper-technical.
To win, or to defend, such cases ordinarily requires the col-
laborative efforts of lawyers, scientists, and engineers serving in
consulting and expert witness roles.2 Depending on the case, the
trier of fact will need to be acquainted with the alleged polluter's
manufacturing and waste handling processes, the raw materials,
intermediates, 3 products, byproducts, and wastes used or gener-
ated in those processes, the topographical and hydrogeological
setting of the property in question,4 the nature and extent of the
contamination, pathways 5 by which humans could have been ex-
posed, and the personal injuries or diseases allegedly suffered.
The trier of fact will also need assistance in determining liability
and damages issues.
t Attorney, Clark, Ladner, Fortenbaugh & Young. B.A. Dartmouth Col-
lege, 1976; M.S. Stanford University, 1980; J.D. Temple University, 1986.
1. For the sake of this Note, the author regards the term "environmental
litigation" broadly, to include both bodily injury (i.e., toxic tort) and property
damage (i.e., remedial investigation and cleanup) cases, including insurance cov-
erage disputes where environmental contamination underlies the coverage case.
2. For a further discussion of the roles of consultants and experts in envi-
ronmental litigation, see section III.A. of this Note.
3. An "intermediate" may generally be defined as any chemical or material
generated during the course of manufacture which is not a product in and of
itself, but becomes a constituent of a final product. See American Mining Con-
gress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
4. Topography (the configuration or relief of the earth's surface) and
hydrogeology (the science of underground water) are critical factors in hazard-
ous waste cleanup cases. Together they influence the means by which pollutants
enter and flow through the environment. See Bradley Mining Co. v. EPA, 972
F.2d 1356, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms
Dairy, Inc., 972 F.2d 453, 455-56 (1st Cir. 1992).
5. The pathways for human exposure include air, surface water, and ground
water. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 132, 137 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
(51)
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Both the plaintiff's and the defendant's experts will usually
be deposed during the course of litigation to discover their opin-
ions. Such depositions are of critical importance to both sides.
The proffering party will want to limit the amount of information
disclosed to the other side because such information can reveal
trial strategy and the expert's weaknesses. The interrogator, on
the other hand, will usually want to probe deeply into the expert's
qualifications and experience in order to undermine the expert in
various ways. Since the deposition is a "sneak preview" of what
will happen at trial, the expert deposition is a most critical event
in the course of environmental litigation. Information revealed,
or not uncovered, in a deposition can greatly influence the out-
come of a trial.
B. Types of Experts
As noted above, experts may be retained to give testimony
about a myriad of issues. Experts, like lawyers, tend to be highly
specialized. Examples of the types of expertise that may be re-
quired are as follows:
1. Experts who can explain the physical/chemical na-
ture of the pollutant. 6
2. Experts who can explain the manner in which the
pollutant initiates, promotes, or causes the disease
to progress in humans. 7
3. Clinical doctors.8
4. Environmental/Chemical/Mechanical/Process
engineers.9
5. Experts in fate and transport of chemicals in air
and subsurface environments (soil, groundwater,
surface water, air).' 0
6. Toxicologists."
6. Chemists or chemical engineers, for example, frequently have this type
of expertise.
7. Medical doctors, biochemists, cellular biologists, and toxicologists are
examples of professionals with this of type expertise.
8. These physicians can confirm or refute the diagnosis.
9. These types of engineers can explain the production and release (or non-
production and containment) and storage, handling, treating, and disposal of
wastes/pollutants.
10. A hydrogeologist is one example of a scientist with expertise in the
transport of groundwater.
11. Toxicologists can explain the movement of toxic agents in the natural
or work environment and explain their interaction with, and effect upon, human
or biotic systems.
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7. Risk assessors/National Contingency Plan (NCP)
compliance experts. 12
8. Biologists.' 3
9. Industrial hygienists.14
10. Epidemiologists. 15
The distinctions between some of the above specialty areas
are not always clear and some experts profess to have expertise
spanning several disciplines. As a practical matter, however, it is
impossible to be truly expert in more than one substantive area.
Thus, it is important during the deposition to pin the expert
down to a particular field of expertise or, alternatively, to allow
the expert to try to portray himself as an expert in more fields
than the trier of fact will consider plausible.
II. EXPERT DISCOVERY GENERALLY
The broad purpose of expert discovery is to first determine
the facts known and opinions held by your opponent's witnesses
and the bases for those opinions. Secondly, the litigator will also
want to assess how well the witness will function at trial. Some
experts are cool, composed, and savvy when dealing with mem-
bers of their own camp, but fall apart when challenged in the
course of a deposition. A third purpose is to obtain admissions
from the expert which will undermine the expert's credibility at
trial, or support the expert testimony the attorney will use at trial.
Finally, the deposition will help both sides evaluate the expert's
credibility and manner of presentation.' 6 Some experts are sim-
ply incapable of delivering testimony at this level, a fact which
should become apparent in the deposition.
Some attorneys use depositions to destroy the opponent's
expert by discrediting and impeaching his qualifications or testi-
mony. This practice is dangerous because it may give your oppo-
12. Risk assessors and NCP compliance experts are typically persons with
environmental engineering or hydrogeology skills. For a further discussion of
the NCP, see infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
13. Biologists can offer testimony on the adverse effects of hazardous sub-
stances on living organisms.
14. Industrial hygienists can testify about industrial hygiene conditions or
practices in an occupational exposure case.
15. Epidemiologists are scientists who study the distribution and causation
of diseases in groups of people, typically after years of study of those groups.
16. For example, in a jury case, it is imperative that one's expert be capable
of communicating sophisticated technical ideas to a lay audience, the jury, with-
out appearing condescending or confusing.
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nent time to procure another, stronger expert. Thus, it is
sometimes worthwhile to reserve particularly damaging cross-ex-
amination for trial. On the other hand, it may sometimes be a
good strategy to deify, rather than skewer, the expert. In cases
where the expert has done a responsible job of discovering con-
tamination and recommending cleanup options to the client, but
the client has ignored the advice, making the expert look good
drives a wedge between the expert and client and may help prove
a case of negligent conduct, or even help form the basis for an
award of punitive damages.
III. GENERAL AND PRE-DEPOSITION CONSIDERATIONS
A. Your Relationship to the Expert; Consultants vs. Experts
The distinction between consultant and expert, although
seemingly inconsequential, actually may have far-reaching conse-
quences in a case, and may become a problem in any expert depo-
sition. If an engineer or scientist is hired by a client or law firm to
give general environmental advice or assist in a nonadversarial
situation, and if discovery of the communications between the
consultant and the client or law firm, or the consultant's notes,
reports, or other work is reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence, this information may have to be
disclosed to opposing parties during any subsequent litigation.17
In contrast, if the consultant is retained or specially em-
ployed in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial but is
not expected to testify at trial, an opponent will generally not be
entitled to obtain the consultant's notes, reports, or work prod-
uct, or learn about the consultant's opinions concerning the mat-
ters at issue.' 8  If, however, the consultant performs
environmental, medical, or other technical work and expects to
rely upon that work at trial as an expert trial witness, opposing
parties will, in most jurisdictions, be entitled to take the expert's
deposition before trial to learn about the work performed by the
expert, and the expert's substance of the opinions and the bases
therefore unless the opponent can demonstrate "exceptional cir-
cumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking
discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other
17. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (permitting "discovery regarding any mat-
ter, not privileged which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pend-
ing action ....").
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
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means."19
In most cases, attorneys defending an expert deposition can
legitimately claim that certain communications with, or work
done by, the expert is not discoverable because it was done in the
expert's role as a consultant, not as an expert trial witness. 20
However, even if the information was generated in the course of a
consultancy, if the expert will rely upon it in support of his opin-
ions at trial, it will likely be discoverable. 21
In sum, experts who are hired in anticipation of litigation or
as trial preparation consultants, and who are not expected to tes-
tify at trial are generally shielded from discovery. 22 On the other
hand, expert trial witnesses and other experts who perform serv-
ices in the ordinary course of a client's business will likely have to
disclose information about their work and opinions at a discovery
deposition.2 3
B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Rule
The attorney-client privilege is, simply stated, a policy
designed to protect a client's right to keep his discussions with his
attorneys confidential. 24 Basically, any and all discussions which
19. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i). Although this rule limits discovery of
these matters to expert interrogatories, and permits further discovery by other
means (e.g., by depositions) only pursuant to a court order, as a practicable mat-
ter many litigants simply agree to depose each others' experts.
20. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) & (b)(4)(B).
21. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) & (b)(4)(A)(i).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) & (b)(4)(B).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) & (b)(4)(A)(i).
24. Privileges are generally a creature of federal and state common law. In
the federal courts, this is provided for by rule. See FED. R. EvID. 501. Article V
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as submitted to Congress, included thirteen
specific non-constitutional privileges, including the lawyer-client privilege. FED.
R. EVID. 501 Report of House Committee on theJudiciary. The House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary eliminated all of the specific rules on privilege, and substi-
tuted one general rule on privilege - Rule 501. Id. Rule 501 states in pertinent
part:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a wit-
ness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to
an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule
of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with
state law.
FED. R. EvID. 501. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (dis-
cussing attorney-client privilege in corporate context).
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solely involve the attorney and client cannot be invaded by the
"other side" unless the client waives his right to the privilege.25
The work-product rule, on the other hand, is a doctrine which
protects from disclosure any information or documents which re-
flect the attorney's thought processes, legal theories, or strategies
developed during the course of representing a client.2 6
An attorney must keep these concepts in mind when the rela-
tionship with an expert is first established, as well as the role each
party can play in safeguarding (or unwittingly undermining) these
privileges. If an expert/consultant reports directly to the client
with no attorney involvement, the risk of ultimately having to dis-
close these communications is enhanced, unless the client is an
attorney acting as such; for example, a corporate officer or em-
ployee who is trained, or licensed, as an attorney but is not acting
as an attorney cannot claim the privilege.2 7 Dealing with the cli-
ent's attorney, who in turn deals with the client, may be a way of
protecting sensitive information, since the expert's/consultant's
consultations with the attorney may fall within his work-product
shield, and the attorney's discussions with the client may be pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege.2 8 Thus, even if no litiga-
tion is threatened or pending at the time the expert is retained to
do the work, it should always be assumed that, perhaps years
down the road, everything that is said and done in the course of
representing the client may ultimately fall into an opposing
party's hands as evidence against the client.2 9
C. Specific "Relationship" Issues Which May Arise at
Deposition
Experts will invariably be asked at their deposition to pro-
duce a copy of their complete file in the matter, including letters
to and from the client (or attorney) and a copy of the proposal or
25. Kevin A. Gaynor et al., Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, in EN-
VIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 215, 237-38 (Janet S. Kole & Larry D. Espel eds.,
1991).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
27. See United States v. Woodruff, 383 F. Supp. 696 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (to
assert attorney-client privilege, person to whom communication was made must
be acting as attorney in connection with communication).
28. Attorney-client privilege gives greater protection to confidential com-
munications than the work-product rule. Gaynor, supra note 25, at 238 ("In con-
trast to the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine is not
absolute.").
29. For a discussion of techniques that help to ensure that information
gathered in an internal corporate investigation will be protected by the attorney-
client privilege and work-product doctrine, see id.
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contract under which the work has been performed. Obviously,
this can prove embarrassing, particularly if, for example, the en-
gagement letter suggests the conclusions the client or attorney
expects the expert will reach. Also, if the expert is being paid a
higher than usual fee, or a fee which is grossly out of proportion
to what is customary in the area, it will suggest bias to the trier of
fact, and therefore may harm one's case. Another example is the
expert's personal notes, which might contain statements made by
the expert revealing his uncertainties or fears, or conceding the
wisdom of certain aspects of the opposing party's expert theories.
Experts will also usually be asked about all meetings they at-
tended, who was present, what was discussed (including what the
lawyer said), what documents were shown to him, and so forth.
Experts also may be asked about previous engagements by the
same or other clients, the number of times the expert has worked
for plaintiffs as opposed to defendants, and other questions
geared toward categorizing the expert's historical orientation in
litigation matters. 30 Such questions are often permissible and
may have to be answered. Thus, as previously suggested, it
should always be assumed that every written and verbal exchange
between lawyer, client, and expert will be discoverable, and that
information about the expert's prior engagements and testimony
will also have to be disclosed.
IV. THE DEPOSITION ITSELF
A. Ministerial and Preparatory Matters
The retention of an experienced court reporter who will not
interrupt the proceedings is essential. Although they are some-
what rare, a reporter with a scientific or medical background or
experience can make an expert deposition run much more
smoothly. Even with an experienced court reporter, though, it is
often a good idea to have the expert read and sign the transcript
to ensure its accuracy.
It may be a good idea to have the expert prepare and bring to
the deposition a list of the principal texts and publications upon
which he relies in support of his opinion(s). While in some cases
this might give the opponent an unfair advantage, a good interro-
gator will try to extract this information from the witness anyway,
30. An expert's possible financial connection to industry should be ex-
plored. Ron Simon, How to Win the Battle of the Experts, TRIAL, Oct. 1992, at 36,
38. In addition, speeches given by an expert at conferences can also reveal any
bias. Id.
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and having it pre-prepared may both assist the expert and cut
down the length of the deposition.
Similarly, exhibits the expert will rely upon at trial should be
available at the deposition. Failure to make them available at the
deposition may give the opponent grounds to preclude their use
at trial on grounds of prejudice.
Obviously, the witness will need to be "prepped" for the
deposition. However, some attorneys overlook or downplay this
task in the belief that the expert is a sophisticated, articulate pro-
fessional who can handle any question that is directed to his at-
tention. Such an attitude is dangerous, as experts often need as
much, if not more, preparation as do ordinary fact witnesses.
This is because they are so knowledgeable about their area of ex-
pertise that they often feel obligated to disclose everything they
know at the deposition, believing the judicial process requires it.
Similarly, experts who are employed in academic settings are
used to lecturing and explaining and find it difficult to adjust to a
litigation environment, in which the basic idea, at least during the
deposition, is to limit the amount of substantive information that
is revealed.
Additionally, it is always critical going into an expert's depo-
sition to know as much about the expert as possible. The expert's
prior deposition and trial testimony from other cases should be
reviewed, as should his or her published writings. Answers to ex-
pert interrogatories and expert reports should be scrutinized and,
where the issues are extremely technical, one's own expert should
be consulted for advice on how to interrogate the opposing ex-
pert. Also, the expert's file(s), including notes taken in the course
of preparing the expert's opinion, can often be fertile ground for
developing good deposition questions.
Finally, when interrogating the expert at the deposition, look
for biases and inconsistencies. For example, such things as an un-
usually high expert fee and the witness's record of testifying for
only plaintiffs or defendants should be made part of the record.
Also, it is often wise to get the expert committed to particular
general propositions or procedures which the expert generally ac-
cepts or follows and to then establish that, in this particular case,
the expert deviated from his normal practice.
B. The Expert's Opinions
The expert's ultimate opinion is, of course, the central in-
quiry. The interrogator will want to pin the expert down to a pre-
8
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cise statement of the opinion, and make sure that all of the
opinions held by the expert are explored. The interrogator will
also want to explore the basis for each opinion, including the
texts and publications relied upon, the training and education the
expert brings to bear upon the opinion, research results, and facts
known or personally observed by the expert, as well as any facts
withheld from him by his client.
The interrogator may want to test the opinion by seeing how
well it stands up under different factual circumstances, and
whether it is consistent with the opinions held by other experts in
the case and with the prior testimony of the expert in other cases.
In addition, the interrogator will want to know where the expert's
expertise ends, and whether, in giving the opinion at issue, the
expert has gone beyond that expertise. In any event, the interro-
gator will try to "box in" the expert by getting him to concede the
boundaries of his expertise. Occasionally, the interrogator may
discover an expert with an inflated view of the breadth of his ex-
pertise, which will not play well with the judge or jury.
In some cases, it may be important to know whether the de-
fendant's actions conformed to the "state of the art" at the time.3 1
For example, in order to establish negligence, a plaintiff will want
to show that the defendant's waste handling/disposal practices
were substandard. 32 Similarly, in an environmental insurance
coverage case, the insurance companies will want to show that the
insured polluter "neither expected or intended" that damage or
harm would result from its conduct.3 3 For example, if the expert
has an industrial background, the interrogator will certainly try to
establish that the expert's former employers utilized commer-
31. "State of the art" refers to the level of understanding or development
in a given field at any particular point in time. Of course, in some cases, the
strict liability nature of many environmental statutes renders inquiries about the
defendant's conduct or knowledge irrelevant. However, many suits nonetheless
include claims based on such common law theories as negligence, nuisance, tres-
pass, or strict liability.
32. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988). In
Sterling, the court concluded that the defendant, Velsicol, had not taken ade-
quate precautions against the release of hazardous waste. Id. at 1192. The de-
fendant disposed of "ultrahazardous" liquid and dry chemical waste by placing
the waste in drums or fiber board cartons, respectively, and burying them in
unlined trenches covered with three feet of soil. Id. at 1192 & n.1.
33. See, e.g., City ofJohnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146(2d Cir. 1989) (discussing meaning of "neither expected or intended" language
in insurance policies). For a general discussion of interpretations of the
"neither expected or intended" clause in insurance policies, see John E. Heintz,
Insurance Coverage Litigation Issues, in ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 177, 199-209
(Janet S. Kole & Larry D. Espel eds., 1991).
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cially available waste disposal equipment at the same time the ex-
pert's client was using the "old" technology.3 4
When waste handling, treatment, or disposal from decades
ago is at issue, it is sometimes difficult to find an expert who is
willing to admit that companies knew or should have known that
what they did would result in pollution. Some plant managers
and engineers who worked in industry in the 1940-1970 time
frame (before most of the current environmental legislation was
passed) will testify that their companies did "what everybody else
was doing" at the time.3 5 Of course, merely proving that a party's
practices were consistent with industry practices may not be suffi-
cient to demonstrate the absence of negligence, if the party could
have adopted state of the art practices or equipment without ex-
cessive cost.3 6 Even where the witness insists that industry offi-
cials lacked subjective knowledge that their activities were
harmful to people or the environment, the interrogator will at-
tempt to establish such knowledge indirectly. 37
C. Standards for Admissibility
The Federal Rules of Evidence contain a general provision
governing admissibility of expert testimony as follows: "If scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opin-
ion or otherwise." '38 Various state rules exist, many of them iden-
tical or similar to the Federal Rule.3 9 However, the rules of
34. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 316, 317 (W.D.
Tenn. 1986) (finding of negligence was based partially on defendant's failure to
comply with state of the art methods of hazardous waste disposal), modified, 855
F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
35. See id. at 310.
36. See id. at 316-17.
37. This may be accomplished by showing, for example, that defendant's
managers took steps to protect workers from the hazardous nature of the chemi-
cals used in the workplace, or were repeatedly warned by neighbors or environ-
mental regulators of the hazardous nature of their operations. See id. at 316.
38. FED. R. EvID. 702.
39. For example, Rule 56 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence provides in
pertinent part:
RULE 56. TESTIMONY IN THE FORM OF OPINION
(2) A witness qualified. . . as an expert by knowledge, skill, expe-
rience, training or education may testify in the form of opinion or
otherwise as to matters requiring scientific, technical or other special-
ized knowledge if such testimony will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.
10
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evidence generally require exclusion of purported expert testi-
mony that is (1) based upon speculation or "guesstimation," (2)
not based upon factors or tests reasonably relied upon by experts
in the field, or (3) would likely mislead the jury. 40
For example, in Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp. ,41 which in-
volved plaintiffs' claims for immune system impairment, the court
noted that an expert's opinions must be based upon generally ac-
cepted theories. 42 The court found that testimony of plaintiffs'
expert immunologist and pediatrician was insufficient to sustain
plaintiffs' burden of proof that the contaminated water damaged
their immune systems. 43 The court reasoned that the clinical eco-
logical44 methodologies upon which plaintiffs' experts relied had
been rejected by the leading professional societies in allergy and
immunology as "unproven... [and] lacking any scientific basis in
either fact or theory." 45 Moreover, the experts could not identify
any studies of the effects of the chemicals of concern on the im-
mune system. 46
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A, Rule 56 (West Supp. 1992).
40. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 provides:
The facts or data ... upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis added).
41. 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
42. Id. at 1208. The court found that "[in accordance with Rule 702, a
four-part test must be met to uphold the admission of 'expert testimony': (1) a
qualified expert (2) testifying on a proper subject (3) which is in conformity to a
generally accepted explanatory theory (4) the probative value of which out-
weighs its prejudicial effect." Id. But see Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593
A.2d 733, 748 (N.J. 1991) (in toxic tort litigation, theory not generally accepted
by scientific community may be admissible if based on sound scientific method-
ology involving data and information comparable to that relied on by experts in
given field). For a further discussion of Rubanick, see infra notes 52-64 and ac-
companying text.
43. Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1209.
44. As described by the court, "[cilinical ecology is premised on a belief
that exposure to a number of factors including, but not limited to, anxiety, radia-
tion, certain chemicals, and even some common household substances can cause
dysregulation of the immune system." Id. at 1208.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1208-09. One commentator has suggested several techniques
that can increase the likelihood that expert medical testimony will be admitted.
First, an attorney should validate the expert's methodology by referring to scien-
tific texts or journals, or by asking another qualified expert to examine the meth-
odology. Second, the expert should provide a detailed description of how cited
articles support the expert's opinion. Third, the expert should describe how
causation judgments are reached in clinical practice, as distinguished from judg-
ments made by scientists performing research where patients are not involved.
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D. The Expert's Qualifications and Theories
In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation47 illustrates a similar
issue, namely, the expert's qualifications to render opinion testi-
mony. In this case, the Third Circuit ruled that the trial court had
abused its discretion by excluding certain testimony by plaintiffs'
experts. 48 For example, the trial court refused to allow a toxicol-
ogist's testimony because she was not qualified to testify as a med-
ical doctor as to the cause of injury or as a chemist about certain
laboratory analytical procedures. 49 A microbiologist's testimony
on the effects of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) on humans
was also excluded because the witness was not trained in differen-
tial diagnosis. 50 In overruling the trial court, the Third Circuit
concluded that "[i]n light of the liberal Rule 702 expert qualifica-
tion standard," the experts should not have been precluded from
testifying "simply because the experts did not have the degree or
training which the district court apparently thought would be
most appropriate. '" 5 1
In Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp.,52 a New Jersey court ex-
amined the same issue, and reached a similar conclusion. In this
case, a trial court's ruling preventing a biochemist from testifying
about the link between PCB exposure and colon cancer was over-
turned on appeal.53 The trial court noted that the witness had a
doctorate in biochemistry, had worked as a biochemist for over
thirty-seven years at the Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Re-
search, was published extensively on carcinogenesis, and was
head of a research unit which investigated the diagnosis and treat-
ment of colon cancer. 54 Nonetheless, the trial court found that
although the witness was qualified to offer an opinion on cancer
in humans generally, the court excluded his testimony because he
was not a physician 55 and because the theory of causation he pro-
Finally, to enhance overall credibility, the expert should carefully review any affi-
davit to be submitted for typographical errors, or any other errors, that hint at
carelessness. Anthony Z. Roisman, Toxic Tort Litigation: Lessons Learned, TRIAL,
Oct. 1992, at 22, 24.
47. 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 11l S. Ct. 1584 (1991).
48. Id. at 856. Other circuits use a stricter standard for admissibility of ex-
pert testimony. See Roisman, supra note 46, at 24.
49. Paoli R.R., 916 F.2d at 855.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 856.
52. 593 A.2d 733 (N.J. 1991).
53. Id. at 737.
54. Id. at 735.
55. The court believed that because the witness was not a physician he
12
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posed was not generally accepted by the scientific community.5 6
The appellate division reversed, and held that a more liberal stan-
dard is required for evaluating the reliability of evidence in toxic
tort cases. 57 In such cases, the fact finder should focus on the
underlying soundness of the novel scientific testimony.58
The New Jersey Supreme Court modified the appellate divi-
sion's opinion, permitting an even broader standard of admission
for expert testimony in toxic tort cases. 59 The court held that,
"[a]lthough the proponent of an expert opinion must demon-
strate that the data or information used were soundly and reliably
generated and are of a type reasonably relied on by experts," the
objective reliability of the opinion, or inferences drawn from data,
do not have to be demonstrated. 60 The court specifically recog-
nized that a novel scientific theory may be reliable, even if contro-
versial, if it is based on sound methodology drawing on studies
reasonably relied on by other members of the scientific commu-
nity and has been used and applied by experts and practitioners
in a given field. 6 1
The New Jersey Supreme Court also stated that the Third
Circuit's approach is compatible with that of New Jersey.62 The
court concluded that in toxic tort cases, a scientific theory of cau-
sation, even though not generally accepted, may be found reliable
"if it is based on a sound, adequately-scientific methodology in-
volving data and information of the type reasonably relied on by
experts in the scientific field."163 Thus, the New Jersey Supreme
therefore lacked the requisite education, training and experience in treating can-
cer patients to qualify as an expert. See Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 576
A.2d 4, 14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), modified, 593 A.2d 733 (N.J. 1991).
56. Rubanick, 593 A.2d at 737.
57. Id. at 735, 738.
58. Id. at 735.
59. Id. at 747-48.
60. Id. at 747.
61. Rubanick, 593 A.2d at 747. The court also stated that evidence found
acceptable by other courts is persuasive. Id.
62. Id. at 746. The court specifically noted its approval of the Third Cir-
cuit's approach to admitting expert opinions. Id. The New Jersey test differs
from the Third Circuit's test for admissibility in only one respect. The Third
Circuit requires the fact finder to make two separate determinations of reliability
- one for the data relied on by the expert, and one for the methodology the
expert used to interpret the data. Id. The Rubanick court stated that the Third
Circuit approach is dictated in part by "the seemingly separate requirements" of
Rules 702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. For a discussion of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and a comparable New Jersey rule, see supra notes
38-40 and accompanying text. However, under New Jersey law, such a dichot-
omy was held unnecessary. Rubanick, 593 A.2d at 747.
63. Id. at 747-48.
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Court has adopted a broad standard for the admission of expert
testimony in toxic tort cases.64 It remains to be seen whether
other state courts will follow suit.
Thus, although the threshold for qualification of experts is
not particularly high, a central focus of the expert deposition
should be to establish where the witness's true area of expertise
lies and where the expert is "out on a limb." It is also important
to establish where the expert's methods and opinions lie in rela-
tion to those of the larger scientific community of which the ex-
pert is (purportedly) a member.65 Finally, the basis for the
opinions offered by the expert must be explored to determine the
extent to which they are of the type commonly relied upon by
respected experts, and the reasonableness of the assumptions
made by the expert.
E. Speculative Expert Testimony - Groundwater Modeling
Cases
Many private-plaintiff toxic tort cases share the common is-
sue of whether contamination at a particular site actually travelled
through the subsurface environment to the place where the plain-
tiffs were exposed to the harmful substances. Parties to litigation
trying to prove or disprove a plaintiff's exposure to the relevant
chemicals frequently resort to using mathematical computer mod-
els.6 6 Such models are designed to permit the user to determine
whether chemical concentrations found at a given location can be
traced backward to the particular place and time that the chemical
was released to the soil or groundwater. When such models are
used, inevitable questions arise as to whether the expert who re-
lies upon them is operating in the realm of fact or speculation;
speculation would render the testimony incompetent.67
64. Id. at 750.
65. To win a case, an attorney representing plaintiffs may need to employ
"creative and far-reaching" strategies to get testimony admitted. Commentator
suggestions include the following: (1) explaining "why the questions presented
in a case are not answered in peer-reviewed medical or scientific journals," (2)
showing that the plaintiff has not offered certain kinds of studies because only
the defendant has the resources and information to perform such studies, and
(3) demonstrating the financial connections and biases of a study's authors. Si-
mon, supra note 30, at 38.
66. For a discussion of the use of computer models in toxic tort litigation,
see infra notes 68-93 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Volasco Prod. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383,
392 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963) ("The evidence must fur-
nish some approximation of the actual damages so that they may be determined
with reasonable certainty. We believe that here the plaintiff, in an effort to be
14
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Although an extended discussion of computer modeling is
well beyond the scope of this Note, 68 a few cases illustrate the
issues surrounding computer models and the requirement that
expert testimony avoid speculation. These issues will, most cer-
tainly, become the subject of an expert deposition in any toxic
tort case. In Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp. ,69 the plaintiffs were
trying to prove that their immune systems were injured after they
drank contaminated well water.70 Plaintiffs employed a ground-
water model to show that carbon tetrachloride and chloroform
were in the wells at the time they drank from them.7' The model
made certain assumptions about such factors as loading rate, 72
infiltration rate,73 dispersal rate, 74 transmissivity, 75 and ground-
water velocity over more than a twenty year period.76
Although plaintiffs' model employed widely accepted model-
ling equations that were not in dispute, defendants challenged
the model on grounds that the results it generated were nothing
more than speculation. 77 Specifically, defendants complained
that the model was fatally flawed because it was based on an insuf-
ficient number of data points (it only used one year's actual
specific, has indulged in theories that result in proof that is speculative, remote
and uncertain." Therefore, court found that evidence should not have been ad-
mitted to trial.).
68. For an extended discussion of groundwater modeling, see Allen Kez-
sbom & Alan V. Goldman, The Boundaries of Groundwater Modeling Under the Law.
Standards for Excluding Expert Testimony, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 109, 109 (1991) [here-
inafter Kezsbom].
69. 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
70. Kezsbom, supra note 68, at 116. For a further discussion of Sterling, see
supra notes 32, 34-37 and accompanying text.
71. Kezsbom, supra note 68, at 116-17.
72. Loading rate is the rate of application of a material to the land surface.
PRACTICAL HANDBOOK OF GROUND-WATER MONITORING 667 (David M. Nielson
ed., 1991) [hereinafter Nielson]. In the Sterling case, the loading rate at issue was
the amount of spent heptachlor catalyst placed into a landfill each year. Kez-
sbom, supra note 68, at 118 n.42.
73. Infiltration rate is the rate at which water flows downward from the land
surface into and through the interstices (pores) in soil and rock. Nielson, supra
note 72, at 664.
74. Dispersal (or dispersion) rate is the rate at which a liquid substance in-
troduced in a ground-water system spreads as it moves through the system. Id.
at 651.
75. Transmissivity is the rate at which water of a given density and viscosity
is transmitted through a unit width of an aquifer or confining bed under a unit
hydraulic gradient. Id. at 689. It is a function of the properties of the liquid, the
porous medium, and the thickness of that medium. Id.
76. Kezsbom, supra note 68, at 117.
77. Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1198-99. Counsel for defendant Velsicol co-au-
thored a paper discussing, inter alia, their challenge to the model employed by
plaintiffs in Sterling. See Kezsbom, supra note 68, at 116-19.
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groundwater contamination data) and because the model's esti-
mates were not validated against available real-world data.78 In
particular, plaintiffs' model extrapolated backward in time from
data obtained in 1978 only, even though post-1978 data also ex-
isted.79 Thus, defendants argued, plaintiff could connect the
1978 point to virtually any point ten years earlier by simply ad-
justing the model's assumptions until the lines matched up, with-
out being constrained by the later data points, which would have
restricted the curve to a particular path.8 0 However, the district
court rejected these contentions, finding instead that the assump-
tions in plaintiffs' model about site conditions were more credible
than those employed in defendant's model. 8 l The Sixth Circuit
upheld this finding on appeal.8 2
Two other examples are instructive. First, in Carroll v. Litton
Systems, Inc. ,83 plaintiffs' expert testified in support of plaintiffs'
questionable theory that groundwater flowed uphill from the
source of the contamination to reach plaintiffs' wells.8 4 While the
expert proffered a theory by which this could happen, he failed to
conduct any tests of plaintiffs' wells, never took any groundwater
measurements in the area, and failed to review rainfall data that
might support his theory.8 5 Thus, the magistrate concluded that
the expert's opinions were "completely lacking of an adequate
factual basis as to when in the past chemicals allegedly arrived
from the plant at plaintiffs' wells" 8 6 and that his testimony was
"speculative and not based upon the kind of facts or data that
would be relied upon by experts in the field."'8 7
Second, in Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp. ,88 another ground-
water model was rejected on grounds that it was speculative.8 9
The model was struck down because it was based upon data that
was not representative of the contaminant load factor. 90 Plain-
78. Kezsbom, supra note 68, at 117-18. A data point is a place or time at
which data (e.g., groundwater samples) are obtained.
79. Kezsbom, supra note 68, at 117.
80. Id. at 118.
81. Id. at 118-19.
82. Id. at 119.
83. No. B-C-88-253, 1990 WL 312969 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990).
84. See id. at *77.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *78.
88. 749 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Colo. 1990), aff'd, 972 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1992).
89. Kezsbom, supra note 68, at 120.
90. Id. at 121. The court found this error to be "a fatal threshold flaw de-
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tiffs' experts opined that 100 parts per million of the contaminant
was discharged into a creek on a regular basis over an eleven year
period, and from there travelled downstream to where plaintiffs
lived. 9' However, the court deemed the experts' model unaccept-
able because it relied upon only one chemical sample, measured
at only one place and time.92 The model assumed (unjustifiably,
according to the court) that contaminant loading persisted for the
entire eleven year period at the very same concentration. 93
In short, when deposing environmental experts, questions
about the basis for the ultimate opinions must be probing and de-
tailed. If real-world data exists that favors one's client, but which
was ignored by the opponent's expert, this fact should probably
be confirmed in the deposition.
F. Risk Assessment Experts
In some cases, the issue of risk assessment may arise. Simply
stated, a risk assessment is an evaluation of whether contaminants
located in a given source area can or did travel via various path-
ways, for example groundwater, foot traffic, or air, to certain re-
ceptors, such as humans or sensitive environments, and the risk
posed by such exposure. 94 An expert in this area must be pre-
pared to evaluate the nature and extent of the contamination in
the source area, the migration pathways by which that contamina-
tion could move, the receptors in the area which might be af-
fected, and the effect of measured or calculated exposures on
such receptors.
Performed properly, a risk assessment is often a mammoth
and expensive undertaking involving the concerted efforts of vari-
ous disciplines. 95 Care should be taken to explore the expert's
experience with risk assessments generally, his familiarity with the
priving the model of any predictive value." Id. "Load factor," as used by the
experts in this case, referred to the quantification (in parts per million) of the
amount of hydrazine contaminant that entered a creek from a wastewater treat-
ment pond. Renaud, 749 F. Supp. at 1549.
91. Renaud, 749 F. Supp. at 1552.
92. Kezsbom, supra note 68, at 121 & n.55.
93. Renaud, 749 F. Supp. at 1552-53. See also Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc.,
862 F.2d 910, 920 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that plaintiff's model "was a matter of
'garbage in, garbage out' " because it was unable to reliably measure direction
of groundwater flow).
94. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1258,
1266 (1st Cir. 1987).
95. See Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, No. 1:CV-90-
1073, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14420, at *16 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (discussing plain-
tiffs' incurring great expense to perform health risk assessment).
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particular topography, soils, and hydrogeology at issue, and his
understanding of the fate and transport of chemicals in the envi-
ronment. It may be possible to discredit the expert's testimony
by showing an unfamiliarity with the particular chemicals or envi-
ronments at issue, or by getting the expert to concede that the
site characteristics are extraordinarily complex and could just as
easily support conclusions other than those reached by the
expert.96
G. National Contingency Plan Compliance
In many cases, experts are employed to vouch for the ade-
quacy of the investigatory and cleanup activities of the party seek-
ing to recoup cleanup costs from other parties. In private-party
cleanup actions brought under the federal Superfund law, 97 the
activities for which reimbursement is sought must be consistent
with a federal regulation known as the National Oil and Hazard-
ous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (National Contin-
gency Plan or NCP).98 Although the details of the NCP are
beyond the scope of this Note, the NCP can be summarized as a
federal regulation which provides guidelines for the proper inves-
tigation and cleanup of contaminated properties. 99 Compliance
with the NCP is required in order for private parties to recover
their response costs from responsible parties.100
Issues which arise in NCP compliance cases include: (1) which
version of the NCP applies (1985 or 1990),ll (2) whether compli-
ance must be "strict" or "substantial,"'' 0 2 (3) whether the investi-
96. See Simon, supra note 30, at 38.
97. "Superfund," as it is commonly known, is the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988). Private party cost recovery actions are covered by
§ 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
98. CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605. For more information on the NCP,
see 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1 to 300.1105 (1992).
99. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1 to 300.1105.
100. Superfund provides that, in private actions to recover the cost of re-
sponding to a release or threat of release of hazardous substances from a site,
the response costs (e.g., investigation, removal, remediation) must be consistent
with the NCP. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
101. The 1985 version of the NCP was published at 50 Federal Register
47,950 and was codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1985). The
1990 version was published at 55 Federal Register 8666 and is codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 300. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1990).
102. Pre-1985 regulations generally required strict compliance, especially
for private party cost recovery actions. In contrast, the 1990 regulations require
substantial compliance. See County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508,
1514 (10th Cir. 1991).
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gation/cleanup must meet the NCP's requirements for a
"removal" action or a "remedial" action, 0 3 and what "ARARs"
(applicable or relevant and appropriate cleanup criteria) apply to
the cleanup.' 0 4 These requirements are the subject of EPA gui-
dance documents and a developing body of federal case law, and
can be counted on to become the centerpiece of much fighting at
expert depositions.
V. SUMMARY
An expert deposition is a double-edged sword. If the witness
is testifying for your client, the object is not to win the case or
impress the attending lawyers with the witness's knowledge and
credentials. In fact, the less an opponent can find out about one's
expert the better off you will be at trial. In some cases, it is advan-
tageous to have an expert put on a lackluster (albeit technically
sound) performance at the deposition so that an opponent will
report to his client that the expert is nothing to worry about at
trial. At the time of trial, a litigator can stun the opponent with
the skillful examination of a now charming, engaging, and im-
pressive expert.
If one is taking the deposition, the object is quite different.
At the very least, the witness's training, education, experience, bi-
ases, and weaknesses should be fully explored. An attempt
should be made to box-in the expert to avoid being surprised at
trial with new data or new opinions which were not inquired
about at the deposition. While an attorney may want to impeach
the expert's testimony with prior, contradictory testimony, such
questioning can also be deferred in hopes of catching the oppo-
nent off-guard at trial. Perhaps most importantly, the witness's
knowledge of the underlying facts should be exhausted, and no
opinions should be left unexplored. Also, the use of hypotheti-
cals, using facts one hopes to prove at trial, can be very useful; if
one succeeds in getting an opponent's expert to render an opin-
ion supportive of your client's position using facts ultimately
found in your client's favor, the results can obviously be quite
stunning.
While expert depositions are quite similar in appearance, and
though most of the usual deposition rules apply, such proceed-
103. A removal action is essentially an emergency response. CERCLA
§ 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). A remedial action refers to a permanent rem-
edy to cleanup a site. CERCLA § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
104. CERCLA § 121(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d).
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ings can be intimidating for attorneys, particularly if they lack
technical training or experience. However, since the expert's tes-
timony will ultimately have to be tried to a judge or jury (neither
of whom is likely to be familiar with the underlying facts or tech-
nically sophisticated), it is perfectly acceptable to ask simplistic,
lay questions. In some cases, the expert will let down his guard
when he learns that the interrogator is technically unsophisticated
and will give damaging testimony in response to broadly-worded
questions.
Many experienced litigators subscribe to the anecdotal view
that cases are won, not at trial, but at depositions, particularly
those of expert witnesses. Careful and thorough preparation for
expert depositions always pays off at trial. The foregoing brief
discussion of some of the critical issues surrounding such deposi-
tions should go a long way toward assisting attorneys who must
defend or take such depositions.
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